THE LIMITS OF
SOCIAL COHESION

*Conflict and Mediation in
Pluralist Societies*

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10. Of the 1.7 million unemployed registered in September 1990, 1.2 million (70 percent) counted as problem cases on account of insufficient education, health problems, and/or a period of unemployment longer than a year. This proportion was also valid for the 1990s. B. Hof, *Für mehr Verantwortung—Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit und soziale Marktwirtschaft* (Cologne, 1991).

11. K.-W. Brand, D. Büsser, D. Rucht, *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft: Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 35.

12. Thus we can assume a close correlation with the so-called "changing values," that is, with the change in attitude that leads from the traditional value of duty to that of self-fulfillment. This aspect cannot be followed up here; see O. W. Gabriel, *Politische Kultur, Postmaterialismus und Materialismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen, 1986); M. Greiffenhagen and S. Greiffenhagen, *Ein schwieriges Vaterland: Zur politischen Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland* (Munich and Leipzig, 1993), pp. 156ff., 221ff.; and K.-U. Hellmann, *Systemtheorie und neue soziale Bewegungen* (Opladen, 1996), pp. 188ff.

13. G. Schulze, *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft: Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt and New York, 1992), pp. 312ff.

14. H. Kitschelt, *Kernenergiepolitik-Arena eines gesellschaftlichen Konflikts* (Frankfurt and New York, 1980), pp. 318ff.

15. E. Heimann, *Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus-Theorie der Sozialpolitik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1990 [orig. 1929]).

16. N. Luhmann, *Soziologie des Risikos* (Berlin, 1991), pp. 93ff.

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Uncertain Ghosts: Populists and Urbans in Postcommunist Hungary

János Mátyás Kovács

Q: Why do the Populists dislike the Urbans?
A: Because they both enjoy sitting in the same cafés, but the Urbans sing folk songs so loudly that the Populists cannot hear themselves talk business.

—A Budapest joke from 1993

Populists and Westernizers in Eastern Europe

There was a moment in the history of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s when the optimistic observers believed that the century-long cleavage between the so-called "Populists" (traditionalists, nativists, nationalists) and "Westernizers" (modernizers, cosmopolitans, liberals) would fade away from the intellectual and political life of the region. Today we know that the rapprochement of the national(ist) and liberal strains of anticommunism was due to the common enemy rather than to normative cohesion. The compromise between the dissenters/dissidents proved to be provisional: It evaporated in the course of the first free elections. Political discourse has been refilled with well-known symbols of conflict, including even extreme forms of demonization such as the identification of national revival with Nazism and, conversely, liberal politics with Jewish conspiracy. Accordingly, the optimistic prognosis of a sweeping victory of "liberalism with a national face" in Eastern Europe had to be revised. Today, instead of a kind of *Verfassungspatriotismus*, nationalism, authoritarianism, and neosocialism are ascendant in many of the new democracies. In most governments of the region, fragmented liberal policies are implemented by illiberal or expressly antiliberal parties.

Was the temporary compromise broken by the nationalists, who reconciled themselves with the old *nomenklatura* (e.g., "red-brown" coalitions) in most of the countries? Not infrequently; ethnic cleansing was the result of this reconciliation. Was the rapprochement ended by the liberals, whose pro-capitalist programs were regarded by many as a betrayal of national traditions and a violation of social justice? Is the new rivalry a natural consequence of the emerging multiparty system, in which an original division of the political space is taking place? Was the compromise canceled by the fact that in certain postcommunist states the old cleavage took the form of national conflict whereby "West-oriented" Czechs, Lithuanians, or Slovenes were confronting the "East-oriented" Slovaks, Russians, or Serbs? Questions without answers. . . .

In most postcommunist societies the major normative conflicts are still ritually attached to (and derived from) comprehensive visions of nativist-traditionalist or West-oriented development. Since 1989 noncapitalist "Third Road" programs have been competing with Grand Designs of catching up with the West. Their followers accuse each other respectively of indulging in a servile imitation of false (unnatural, alien, unorganic, etc.) patterns of progress and taking romantic pride in backwardness (ignorance, obscurity, parochialism, etc.).

The passionate debates trickle down from the scientific and political level of the rival world outlooks and permeate all possible conflicts between cultures, religions, ethnic groups, genders, and so on, on the level of moral attitudes, behavioral patterns, everyday fashions, and literary styles. For example, a typical nationalist theorist/politician in Eastern Europe would fight any extension of gay and lesbian rights supported by the liberals in the following way: He would begin with the abstract concepts of nation and family as society's fundamental components; then he would stress the moral duty of the individual to save the nation by stopping the decline of birth rates in the country (at this point he would also refer to Christian ethical rules of childbearing); historical examples would follow in solemn sentences about the manly virtues of national heroes, the idyllic large families in the countryside, and the heroism of mothers; next he would list a couple of quasi-pragmatic arguments concerning AIDS, the defense capability of the country, and the welfare budget; thereafter instructions would be given on "normal" sexual behavior (possibly caricaturing those with "perverse" habits by using vulgar terms of slang) and on the role of the government in correctly educating the citizens and strictly punishing sexual crimes; then the materialism, godlessness, and relativism of the West would be accused (probably with anti-Semitic overtones); and finally our nationalist, if he is not short of demagogy, would warn the nation that excessive permissiveness may turn into new totalitarianism, and sooner or later gayness will become obligatory.

How would a typical Westernizing liberal support the emancipation of homosexuals? First of all, he would stress that contrary to the accusations, he is not speaking out of self-interest. He would simply like to protect universal human rights that belong to man by birth. Then he would refer to recent liberal legislation in advanced Western countries and to current scientific evidence (e.g., the genetic roots of homosexuality) to prove that the extension of gay and lesbian rights does not lead to rising criminality, falling birth rates, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Just the opposite is true, he would argue: It is the illegal conditions under which the homosexuals are forced to live that increase morbidity and criminality. Most likely, our imaginary liberal would not confine himself to "cold" argumentation but he would draw passionate parallels between political, racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination, using the example of the Holocaust and Stalin's terror. Finally (if he is not short of demagogy) he would ridicule some of the national heroes by pointing to the fallibility of their character (womanizing, rude sexual habits, etc.) and ask irreverently: So what if the nation slowly dies out? That already happened to higher cultures in the world.

In the Prison of a Dichotomy

Is it appropriate to use the old designations and call the current confrontation a struggle between "Populists" and "Westernizers"? Nothing is more comfortable than falling back on a routine language with flexible vocabulary. In witnessing the renaissance of a somewhat familiar political discourse in the postcommunist countries, the observers appear to be satisfied with the old clichés about the *Slavophils* and the *zapadniks* formed in nineteenth-century Russia and later applied to similar normative cleavages in East-Central Europe between the two wars.[1] Obviously, these clichés lost some of their relevance during the Communist period. (For instance, it proved to be very difficult to situate the Communists with their pseudo-internationalist nationalism and outmoded modernization ideology within the Populist–Westernizer scheme.) Now there is a temptation to reactivate this old dichotomy with the help of the so-called "refrigerator thesis," according to which communism only froze the old normative conflicts in Eastern Europe, which reappeared in full strength after the refrigerator door had been opened in 1989.

The thesis is usually supported by horror-examples of wild nationalism ranging from the Russian *Pamiat'* movement to the Serb *cetniks*. The protracted and ambiguous revival of Eastern European liberalism apparently does not fit in well with the metaphor of the refrigerator.[2] I am afraid that postcommunist affairs hardly lend themselves to an analysis based on simple dual schemes. Nationalist/populist rhetoric may hide

resolutely liberal economic measures (Hungary 1990–1994, Slovakia 1993–1996) and proudly liberal governments may pursue populist-style policies of mass privatization (Czech Republic). People who call themselves liberal in economic matters may vote for restrictive abortion laws or lobby against the separation of the church from the state (Poland). Allegedly West-oriented Czech or Slovene politicians still use quasi-nationalist arguments when justifying the secession, not to mention the liberals in the Baltic states. Croatian Catholicism is regarded by many as a Western feature as opposed to Serbian Orthodoxy, while Catholicism in Slovakia is treated as "less Western" than Czech Protestantism.

Typically the political parties in the region are divided into a number of rival factions (not simply into two platforms), and the similar groups do not join forces across party lines or national borders to create two distinct political blocs. The same applies to their academic and artistic entourage. To take an extreme example, cooperation between a Serb and a Croat liberal against their nationalist opponents is almost as unlikely as an alliance between the nationalists themselves. In many countries no significant liberal force exists in the political and intellectual arena. Here, if there is a cleavage at all, it occurs between the representatives of moderate and radical nationalism/populism. It is also very difficult to find a place for the rapidly rising neosocialists or the unexpectedly weak environmentalists in a Populist-Westernizer dichotomy.

The semantic obstacles are also immense. Mutual stigmatization by the rival camps has resulted in strange synonyms (populist, nationalist, and conservative on the one hand; Westernizer, cosmopolitan, democrat, and liberal on the other), which are often used against each other as four-letter words. As a consequence, hybrid solutions such as Christian democracy, Christian socialism, and social democracy are ab ovo excluded from the classification. Recurrent attempts of analysts using the left-right distinction in the same context (they ask, for example, whether the new Eastern European nationalists are rightists or rather leftists) is a further complication. Umbrella concepts such as populism (which originally referred to Russian *narodnichestvo* and not to a certain technique of political mobilization and manipulation) and Westernism (which is based on an image of the future that changes along with Western capitalism) are contrasted as if their meanings were unambiguous. Sometimes it is simply futile to look for any coherent meaning at all (e.g., Zhirinovsky's "liberaldemocratic" party in Russia), because the so-called New Populists in Eastern Europe try to follow both their "premodern" predecessors and their "postmodern" colleagues in the West.[3]

In the literature of the Populist-Westernizer debate a whole catalogue of antagonisms was created to support a dichotomic model of East and West: tradition versus modernity, collectivism vs. individualism, infor-

mal relations vs. formalized institutions, direct vs. indirect democracy, egalitarianism vs. meritocracy, fundamentalism vs. pragmatism, dogmatism vs. relativism, romanticism vs. realism, nation vs. citizen, religion vs. secularization, past vs. future, localism vs. universalism, village vs. city, agrarian vs. industrial development, nature vs. technical civilization, closed vs. open society, and so on. One could list such pairs of concepts almost indefinitely. Probably these concepts were helpful in comprehending the normative cleavages in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, however, both the Eastern and Western pillars of the Populist-Westernizer paradigm have undergone substantial changes. Today any dichotomic structure may turn out to be a straitjacket. Something may have happened in that communist refrigerator. Perhaps it was unplugged from time to time, or its door was opened repeatedly, because some of the old conflicts had rotted by 1989. Nonetheless, some others, while hibernated, have been able to adjust to the changing environment. To avoid this nonsense in biophysics, I prefer to use a less scientific metaphor, the metaphor of the ghosts who were periodically allowed by the Communist rulers to rise from their graves, to scare each other and see the world develop. To put it simply, the Populists were reactivated when the Communist elite needed patriotic legitimation, and the Westernizers were sought when the *nomenklatura* wanted to initiate limited market reforms and open up a little to the West. Small wonder that our ghosts have become uncertain during the decades of their disappearance and reappearance.

Rivalry in Indecision

East and West—what do they mean? Central Europe's separation from Eastern Europe, the Russian crisis, the survival of communism in China, and so on are exciting puzzles, which show a great variety of "Eastern" developments. Even if one disregards the question of what "East" means after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, who would dare specify the notion of *the* West, which—depending on how you see it—has reached its postmodern stage or is just celebrating the triumph of liberalism? For the sake of a thought experiment let us accept the latter. If liberal ideas have conquered the world, which current of liberalism could Eastern Europe join? In American conservative thought, for instance, both Eastern European nationalists and liberals may easily find firm points of reference, depending on whether they choose the communitarian or the free-market message of the various theories. Or let us take the example of egalitarian (communitarian, multicultural) liberalism: Would it be a Populist or a Westernizer project if it were accepted by wide circles of intellectuals in Eastern Europe? "Beyond the age of Enlightenment," is there still a quin-

tessence of Western civilization that may serve as a universal goal for postcommunist transformers? Whether or not we accept postmodern skepticism or liberal euphoria, the transformers are faced by both.

As regards real capitalism, West may in fact mean East (Asia) or South (Europe) for the Westernizers of our time when they search for success stories to study. In other words, less and more liberal options are equally offered in the marketplace of ideas. A Westernizer today sees a much more colorful mixture of capitalisms than his *zapádnik* predecessor at the end of the nineteenth century, even if he is presented with the idea of the united Europe as an almost mandatory destination of the Westernizing project. The Westernizer is also disturbed by the fact that he recognizes a great number of "Eastern" elements in the daily workings of Western capitalism (French separatism in Quebec, religious strife in Northern Ireland, organized corruption in Italy or Japan, romantic anticapitalism in the European Green movements, state-led modernization in Southeast Asia, resurgent right-wing populism in Western Europe, national rivalry within the European Union, etc.). With a slight exaggeration, the only thing he knows for sure is that (re)joining the West may be the sole guarantee for his country to remain in the North. At the same time, even the most dedicated Westernizers feel a bit betrayed by Western politicians, who in 1989 promised more assistance and less "entrance examination" to Eastern Europe.

The Populist, while enjoying the inconsistency of the Westernization project, probably encounters even greater difficulties when defining the national traditions he would like to preserve. Where is the peasantry ("the cornerstone of the nation") he wishes to emancipate? Where is the rural idyll he swore to protect? What does national culture mean in the age of the Internet and cable TV? How can one preach isolation and egalitarianism and advocate Grand Social Experiments after so many decades of communist autarchy, leveling, and permanent experimentation? State paternalism, collectivism, social protection, and so on have also partly been discredited by the ancien régime. Anticapitalism needs existing capitalism first. Anti-Semitism has changed its utility in political programs since the Holocaust. Ethnicity and religion (i.e., two weak points in standard liberal theory) remain the trumps in the hands of the Eastern European Populist until emerging capitalism delivers the arguments against itself. Or he may rely on nostalgic communism. After a while these three sources (ethnic nationalism, renascent anticapitalism, and whitewashed communism) can merge, and the Populist may add the principle of social responsibility, firm moral standards, and law and order to the trumps just mentioned. With a partial devaluation of nationalism by the Yugoslav and post-Soviet wars, it is the critique of "Wild-East" capitalism that is currently occupying the center of populist

discourse in Eastern Europe. Will this new compound save populism or destroy it? Will the flirt with nostalgic communism prove a fatal embrace? These dilemmas should encourage the Eastern European analysts to update, attenuate, and open up the old dichotomies.

To reform our conceptual schemes is all the more urgent because the Populists and Westernizers have already begun to reform their agendas. Let me refer to my original field, the current history of economic thought, and take an example from there. During the early to mid-1990s, the liberal economists of Eastern Europe had to accept the paradox that the market cannot be exclusively created by the market, the state may be an agent of deregulation, and liberalization needs social support. Accordingly, their Westernization ideals have rapidly moved from a less interventionist, occasionally neoliberal model of capitalism to the more interventionist concept of *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*. At the same time, the populist-minded economists had to come to terms with severe constraints of national isolation, state dirigism, small entrepreneurship, agrarian and social protectionism, and anticonsumerism in a global economy or in the process of European integration. Until now, neither neoliberal nor Latin-American-type populist revolutions have taken place in the former Eastern Bloc.[5] While the latter may break out in the Eastern part of the region at any time, a gradual and limited rapprochement of the two camps' programs seems more likely. Certain forms of conservatism, communitarian liberalism, environmentalism, etc. may prove to be appropriate fields in which they can meet. Another option would be that the difficulties in formulating coherent Populist and Westernizer agendas lead the antagonists to ignore the Grand Ideologies and experiment with a postmodern "anything goes" mixture of concepts. Today two major political groups are making attempts to neglect or ridicule the old normative cleavage: the Neo-Socialists and the New Populists. These ghosts are far from being uncertain....

Why Hungary?

Although in present-day Eastern Europe it is rather difficult to squeeze the tradition versus modernity, nationalism versus liberalism, etc. debates into the Populist-Westernizer model, there is a country in the region, Hungary, in which these types of normative cleavages can be observed (1) in a transparent dichotomic breakdown and (2) in a surprising historical continuity.[6]

The country exhibits: powerful but only half-successful attempts at embourgeoisement from the early nineteenth century onward, which have created an oversized group of intellectuals without eliminating the peasant question (i.e., the armies were ready to fight and the ammunition

was abundant); a brief period of hard-line communism followed by three decades of a relatively permissive reform-communist regime (i.e., the belligerents were allowed—occasionally urged—to shoot at each other); ethnic homogeneity, large Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, and a large Jewish community in Budapest (i.e., the front line between "Hungarian nationalists" and the "Jewish liberals" was relatively stable); no dominant church and a high degree of secularization (i.e., no religion could reconcile the fighters or cross-cut the conflict). As a result, one sees two large camps of intellectuals and politicians concentrated in the capital who still call themselves (and each other) "Populists" or "National-Populists" and "Urbans" or "Westernizers." Today they use terms that were coined back in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and do not cease to consider their confrontation a regular cultural war that goes beyond conventional political struggle.

In this chapter I will try to explain why the Populist-Urban (PU) conflict? in Hungary shows such a high degree of continuity. What happened in the "communist refrigerator"? How could the PU cleavage almost outcompete even the communism-capitalism clash inherent in the 1989 revolution? I will also examine why reconciliation has proved unsuccessful so far, and how truce can be converted into peace. Finally, I will meditate on mediation between the belligerents. What can be its final goal: mutual tolerance or cultural synthesis? Which patterns of mediation have failed and which promise success? Can the Populist-Urban conflict be buried for good?

In Hungary the PU cleavage is considered an eternal fact of social life. The Populists write tragic ballads, the Urbans ironic studies about why their conflict cannot be resolved. While I am also skeptical about the Big Solutions, I would like to examine the small ones.

Populists and Urbans in Hungary (1930s–1990s)

The Prewar Debate and the "Original Sin"

"Garden Hungary," "elevation of the peasantry into the nation," "qualitative socialism," "Third Road," "ex oriente lux," breaking the monopoly of the feudal aristocracy, the Catholic Church and Jewish/German capitalism, "guilty Budapest," "deep" versus "diluted" Hungarians, and so on—these were standard phrases in populist terminology during the period between the late 1920s, when the first manifestos[8] were published by populist ideologues, and the 1943 Szárszó meeting, their last public gathering before the end of the war.[9]

With a few exceptions, they were all writers, some of them widely educated talents, no more than two dozen intellectuals altogether who had no formal organizations, only one or two literary journals. The Populists

managed to launch short-lived political actions (such as the "New Spiritual Front" in 1935 and the "March Front" in 1937) and lasting cultural initiatives (studies in rural sociology, "People's Colleges") rather than new political movements or parties. Being devoted to a kind of plebeian radicalism against the aristocracy and the so-called Christian middle class (including the gentry), they equally flirted with the communists and the protofascists. In other words, as followers of the tradition of agrarian socialism (many of them were born in the countryside), they could equally criticize feudal and capitalist exploitation and represent "Blut und Boden" vitalism, frequently mixing anti-German, anti-Soviet, and anti-Semitic arguments.

The Third Road, the synthetic concept of populist theory in Hungary, meant avoiding Western (above all, German and Jewish) capitalism without choosing Russian communism. According to this idea, there was a sort of national-oriented agrarian socialism in the middle, which seemed to be the best (and a morally superior) way to overcome feudalism and solve the "peasant question," the crucial problem of Hungarian society. Land reform and cultural emancipation of the peasants were the fundamental claims in the populist program. The idealization of national self-reliance, the identification of the nation with the People and the People with the peasantry, a Protestant-style anti-Catholic rhetoric and social responsibility for the poor (the "three million beggars" of Hungary) were also important ingredients of this single-issue movement of *Volkstümlich* intellectuals. In contrast to the prevailing ideology of the time, the Populists' nationalism initially was not irredentist. Instead of taking a revanchist approach to the Trianon peace treaty that deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its territory, many Populists cherished the nineteenth-century idea of a Danubian confederation of the "clean, young peoples" with their autarkic economic systems. Also, they were not dogmatically anti-modernist; they only represented a peculiar, "organic" strategy of modernization from below, which originates in the countryside and relies not on "parasitic aliens" but on indigenous small entrepreneurs, their cooperatives and banks. The industrial workers as well as the urban middle class escaped the Populists' attention.

In this program the merciless critique of Hungarian feudalism and the claims of romantic anticapitalism (anti-Westernism) were interconnected. This was what fundamentally challenged the liberal thinkers, while, of course, they also felt provoked by the racist and nationalist arguments of the Populists. The Urbans[10] did not represent the protofascist Miklós Horthy regime prevailing in Hungary between the two wars. Nevertheless, they—that is, a small group of writers and journalists (who were even less organized than their opponents)—became targets of vigorous populist criticism in the middle of the 1930s. The intellectual/ideological ex-

plosives of the controversy had already been accumulated at the end of the 1920s, and only a spark was lacking to set the normative conflict into flames. It was provided by an article written in 1934 by the "pope" of populism, László Németh, on the necessity of limiting the influence of Jews on Hungarian literature. The counterattack was inevitable: A leading representative of the Urbans accused Németh of being a spiritual terrorist. He responded by using the analogy of Shylock from *The Merchant of Venice*, thereby cementing the debate in a Jewish versus non-Jewish dimension. Since this duel, there has been no durable peace along the PU front line in Hungary.

The Urbans felt offended by a brief flirtation in 1935 between the populist writers and the radical nationalist prime minister, Gyula Gömbös, which openly broke the solidarity within the group of critical intellectuals. This episode was regarded by the liberals as the "original sin." Even if there had been a rational dispute between the two groups before, the support (or tacit acceptance) by many Populists of the Nuremberg-style anti-Jewish legislation in Hungary during the second half of the 1930s certainly excluded reconciliation. This entire drama happened in Budapest, sometimes at the neighboring tables of the same café. And it ended with the physical liquidation of a great number of Urbans and with the unholy alliance of the Populists with the right-wing regime or its communist opposition during the war.

The Urbans were on the defensive throughout the PU controversy of the 1930s. They did their best to save as much from the capitalist modernization project as possible during the low tide of liberalism after World War I and the Great Depression. With only a few elitist liberals in their ranks, the Urbans were essentially social democrats of the time who expected growing welfare for the working classes (including the peasantry and the urban middle strata) from capitalist progress without strong state interference and social protectionism. They could not offer, however, quick solutions for the problems of rural unemployment, mass poverty, emigration, and so on. In an understandable lack of clear economic visions about the immediate future of capitalism, they gave elementary lectures to the Populists on the advantages of industrialization, foreign trade, and banking, or instead, focused on the defense of human and civic liberties endangered by the upsurge of national socialism. The Urbans were anxious about the possible links between populist and fascist theories. Therefore, they stressed the differences between mythical and rational reasoning, the ethnic and political concepts of nation, decadence, and civilization, rural idyll and economic progress, etc. And, loyal to the label of "urbanness," they protected the idea of the city, in particular that of the cosmopolitan metropolis, against the "virgin provinces."

The majority of Urbans came from Jewish middle-class families. Despite the political diversity of their group (there were anarchists, radical and conservative liberals, social democrats, even communists among them), its normative cohesion with regard to some basic issues of liberalism was strong. They named their cultic journal "West" and desperately preached the "European values" of civilization in an era of a grave crisis of European identity. Small wonder that they were not able to touch the souls of even the most moderate Populists. Yet, in retrospect, one can perhaps define a middle ground, where the warriors might have met to bury their hatchets. In principle, a New Deal-type social-democratic economic program with an emphasis on agriculture could have served as a compromise. The common enemy could have been found in the so-called "neo-baroque" regime of Admiral Horthy, German fascism, and Soviet communism. Instead of this, if there occurred any rapprochement between the two sides (e.g., the March Front), it followed the logic of populist arguments. Due to mutual stigmatization ("snobs" and "peasants," "aliens" and "anti-Semites," etc.), group solidarities became extremely strong. No influential mediators appeared in the controversy, and there was virtually no migration (no converts, no traitors) between the two camps. Personal quarrels, nasty revenges, malicious gossip, prejudices and denunciations were all components of a hostile relationship bordering on tribalism. The rivalry of vested interests in the intellectual marketplace and the intrigues of the government (although the confrontation was not channeled into party politics) may be additional reasons for the lack of reconciliation.

Quarrel Under Communist Control

Serving the Lord. The postwar years in Hungary, with their emotional blend of reconstruction euphoria, repentance, and a fresh start in democratic politics, could have become an era of PU peace if the Communists had not joined the confrontation. Actually, quite a few young Marxists were already active participants in the polemic during the 1930s as members of the populist movement. With the gradual *Gleichschaltung* of the peasant parties by the Communists in the second half of the 1940s, a great number of former Populists converted to the new faith. Opportunism aside, they were enchanted by the fact that the Communists borrowed their land reform project and many of their egalitarian, social-protectionist ideas. Furthermore, they loved the antireactionary rhetoric and their generous promises concerning free agricultural cooperatives, rural banks, and so on.

The Communists, whose top leaders were without exception Jews belonging to the Muscovite faction of the party, had an enormous deficit in

patriotic image. In order to counterbalance the "alien" character of the Marxist-Leninist program, they invented a new, people-and-nation-based interpretation of Hungarian history. According to this approach, the Communist regime was an inevitable result of a long series of fights for national independence and social justice; that is, communism was an ultimate embodiment of plebeian truth. The peasants, stylized as agrarian proletarians, were co-opted in the working class, so populism could be harmonized with the Marxian theory of class struggle. The two thought worlds also overlapped in terms of the idealization of the "People." The beginning of the Cold War, the ferocious anti-West campaign in the Soviet Union, and the nationalist zeal of the *Zhdanovschina* provided a firm background to this spiritual coalition.

Strangely enough, the alliance of the Populists and the Communists survived (1) the forced establishment of the *kolkhoz* system and the impoverishment of the villages in the late 1940s and early 1950s; (2) the crushing of the 1956 revolution and the following "socialist consolidation" crowned by a new wave of violent collectivization in agriculture; and (3) the quasi-liberal economic reforms of János Kádár during the 1960s and 1970s, which brought about income differentiation, Westernization of lifestyles and consumption patterns, etc.—all anathemas in populist ideology. This paradox needs a more profound explanation than a simple reference to opportunistic behavior. Most Populists were not only corrupted by spectacular though second-rate jobs in the government. They were also attracted first—between 1953 and 1956—by the program of the pro-peasant faction of the Communist Party, led by the prime minister of the 1956 revolution, Imre Nagy, and later by Kádár's pragmatic agrarian policy based on semiprivate cooperatives, which by and large solved the peasant question in Hungary. By the 1980s quite a few Populist radicals of the younger generation believed that the Hungarian nation paid an unfairly high cultural price for economic welfare in the provinces. However, instead of turning their back to the Communists for good, they found a "godfather" again in the Communist leadership in the person of Imre Pozsgay. Pozsgay, a self-made party intellectual from the countryside, was at that time competing with György Aczél, Kádár's chief ideologue since 1956, and who was also an urban Jew.

What kind of roles were assigned by the Communists to the few remaining representatives of the Urban camp after the war? In contrast to the Populists, they were not commissioned to serve as "moral entrepreneurs." While suffering from a lack of patriotic legitimacy, the Communists thought they had no modernization deficit. Hence they treated the liberals with contempt as "bourgeois reactionaries" and the social democrats, who were rivals in Marxist theory, with suspicion and feelings of inferiority. None of the Urban groups were of any use for the new

regime. With the exception of a few leftist social democrats, who helped the Communists unite the two parties, the Urbans of the 1930s rejected collaboration by leaving the country or choosing passive resistance. Those who remained were marginalized from the very beginning, not infrequently in an aura of anti-Semitic allusions—an exercise by the Communist leaders in overcompensation. At the same time, the Communists commissioned young intellectuals (many of them were Jews) from their own ranks to perform the daily tasks of "agitation and propaganda." Many of these writers, journalists, philosophers and social scientists became members of the old generation of Hungarian liberals by 1989. However, on their way to liberalism they had to go through several phases of the Communist Purgatory. Needless to say, they were regarded by the Populists as natural heirs of the prewar Urbans. Their own "original sin" of having served the Communists between 1945 and 1953 has not been forgiven, even now.

As time passed in the early 1950s, the Stalinist regime in Hungary proved unable to domesticate its own intelligentsia. Unwillingly, it created a great many PU-neutral intellectuals, a large group of dissenters who came, for example, from among those country boys and girls who were students in the legendary People's Colleges closed down by the Communists in the late 1940s as well as from among those young communist intellectuals who felt ashamed to have written long articles in the party newspaper to justify the eradication of these institutions. They became the core of the revolutionary generation in 1956. Their PU immunity stemmed from many sources: the joint frustration of being cheated by the Communist oligarchy; the widely accepted idea of making communism democratic and patriotic; the continued exclusion of the older generation of the Populists and Urbans from the public discussions even after Stalin's death in 1953 (with the exception of the revolutionary weeks in 1956); the participation of a large group of social scientists, economists, lawyers, and engineers in the debates; and the short-lived experiment with democratic politics in 1956, which did not allow for the renascent parties to sharpen the PU conflict. In other words, 1956 provided the following lessons in conflict resolution: If there is a common enemy (hardliner Communists) and a joint ideology (democratic/patriotic socialism), if the protagonists do not carry the moral burden of former fights and the language of the debate is increasingly rational (i.e., the discourse of the new professional participants cannot be arranged in bipolar schemes as easily as the prophetic visions of writers), and if there is no electoral competition, then the Populists and the Urbans can forget their normative cleavages for a while.

The PU peace of 1953–1956 was prolonged by Soviet occupation and Communist oppression during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Prison is

an appropriate place for normative cohesion, at least for political victims. Once again, reconciliation along the PU front line was disturbed by the Communists. After 1956, the Kádár regime expected assistance not only from Populist patriots but also from social engineers, above all economists, who could deliver the reform programs of market socialism,[11] to reduce popular discontent. This dual strategy presupposed a controlled involvement of both camps of intellectuals in the upper-middle levels of policymaking. Kádár and Aczél applied the classical warfare of *divide et impera* in the form of what they called the strategy of "two-front struggle" and the "3T principle" (constructed from the first letters of the Hungarian words for prohibition, toleration, and support). The Communists situated themselves at the center of the political space and distanced their position from the imaginary—nationalist and liberal—extremes, the "two fronts," left and right, as they simplistically depicted them. The prohibitive regulations of censorship were gradually softened, the scope of toleration was broadened as self-censorship became habitual, and support was given in small doses to the Populists and the Urbans alternately.

The Urbans, now a large group of ex-communist intellectuals (many of the 1956 vintage) as well as a growing number of nonparty experts, moved closer to social-liberalism. The Prague Spring in 1968, the Solidarity movement in 1980/81 (neither of which concerned the Populists), and the ups and downs of the Hungarian economic reforms between 1964 and 1989 were crucial stages of the learning process leading from neo-Marxism and market socialism to liberalism. This was the first time throughout the PU controversy when the identification of liberalism and Jewishness became a mathematical nonsense. True, quite a few members of the Lukács School (Kindergarten and Creche)[12] as well as many of the so-called reform economists, that is, the two major groups of opinion leaders among the future liberals, were born in urban Jewish families. Nonetheless, they represented a diminishing share of liberal-minded professionals that rapidly grew in number (a sign of Kádárist modernization, by the way).

The redirection of the PU debate to the "Jewish versus non-Jewish" track presupposed the amortization of the Kádárist social contract of "small freedoms." The radical wing of the liberals (the so-called *samizdat* group or Democratic Opposition) rejected self-censorship at the end of the 1970s, whereas the Populists, who were still led by writers, looked for new protectors in the ruling elite to compensate for the deterioration of their relative position. This deterioration was a consequence of the devaluation of populist ideas in the eyes of the Communists, who gradually established their own—profane—principle of national legitimation based on the pride of managing "the happiest barrack in the communist camp." This management required a limited liberalization of the economy and

Westernization of the society, that is, professional (Urban) recipes rather than fine words on national virtues or anxieties about the Hungarians abroad. The secularization of communism was a menace to national romanticism: In terms of normative cohesion, a cynical communist might be closer to an Urban than to a Populist, or at least this is how the latter tended to interpret the triangle. Materialism, moral relativism, cosmopolitanism, and so on were products of a communist-liberal conspiracy, they argued, and it was not too difficult to find the obligatory Jewish intriguers in the persons of Aczél and Lukács to complete the theory.

Imre Pozsgay, who in the second half of the 1980s replaced Aczél in the job of the chief ideologue, took over part of this criticism, translated the Populists' discourse into communist language, and applied their basic themes (which ranged from social anomie, through cultural colonization to the tragedy of Hungarian minorities) in the power struggle within the party. At that time, there was once again a growing demand for the national-romanticist views of the Populists among some ruling Communists, who were frustrated by the stagnation and decay of Kádár's "economic miracle" under the aging leader. Hence the Populists regained part of their role of a spiritual *Hoflieferant*, though for their services they got too little, too late.

Playing the Game. In the first section I talked about the ghosts of Populists and Westernizers who were allowed by the Communists to rise from their graves—a risky enterprise anyway. How could their earthly activities be controlled? In the period between 1945 and 1948 the reemergence of the PU divide was inhibited by the fresh memory of the war. Quite a few Populists felt sorry for having indirectly assisted the Holocaust and regretted the myopic attitude of having quarreled with the Urbans even on the eve of the Nazi occupation of Hungary. They were not dishonest in regarding the death or the emigration of their antagonists as a victory in the normative conflict. The PU cleavage was not deepened by the new democratic polity either, because it opened a large window of opportunity to overcome the feudal legacies of the Horthy era in a joint effort.

From 1948/49 on, with the exception of the 1956 revolution, it was the Communists who controlled the development of the PU confrontation by constantly modifying the relative position of the two camps. They used stick-and-carrot techniques to balance the relationship between the nationalists and the liberals and behind-the-scenes machinations to prevent them from joining forces. By fine-tuning the rules of censorship after 1956,[13] the Communists could define the ideological frontiers as well as the main actors, themes, and languages of the PU controversy until the formation of the *samizdat* movement in the late 1970s. During the 1960s and 1970s, at least two dozen major public debates took place in Hungary. Their participants regularly used the "Populist" and "Urban" des-

ignations when interpreting the conflict in private. (In the 1980s these adjectives reappeared in public discussions as well.) What for the outside world often seemed to be a fight between Communist reformers and hard-liners, national-minded and Muscovite Communists, or conservative Marxist-Leninists and neo-Marxists frequently hid a typical PU debate as well.

The PU controversy under Communist control displayed a large variety of subjects, whereas the structure of the debates was relatively stable. As a rule, someone (either a Populist or an Urban) challenged, upon his own initiative or suggestions "from above," what was thought to be the official party line. While the Communist leaders were bargaining among themselves about the ultimate word of the party in the discussion, they mobilized their nationalist or liberal clients in and outside the party to respond to the initial challenge. The debates almost automatically turned into multilateral fights with a great many intermediary positions until the party intervened, now publicly, and playing as unbiased referee, closed the discussion by specifying the "truth" between two extremes. It was precisely this artificial definition of the extreme positions that prolonged the PU conflict through a polarization of the political discourse. No matter whether the discussions focused on "consumer socialism" or the subsidization of cultural goods in the 1960s, birth control or alcoholism in the 1970s, or the shadow economy or welfare reform in the 1980s, just to name a few," they usually ended with a simultaneous disapproval of the "leftist" and "rightist" protagonists.

This was a trap because any opting out of the game would have meant risking the turn of Communist policies toward the rival group of intellectuals. And conversely, remaining in the game promised a gradual modification of the party directives in favor of one's own program. Both camps tried to exclude certain combinations. The Urbans feared the alliance of the Populists and the Communist hard-liners, and the Populists wanted to avoid the coalition of the Urbans with the reform Communists—a special version of the Prisoners' Dilemma. To many of the players who developed a sort of *Hassliebe* with each other, the art of politicking became an obsession. This game was played until some of the PU participants realized that there were chances for an agreement outside the Communist framework and its price was not prohibitively high." At the end of the 1970s, the two camps ceased to communicate with each other exclusively via the weakening Communist Party. Indirect rivalry was complemented with direct—occasionally, public—cooperation for some years. The memory of the 1956 revolution, the oeuvre of the democratic theorist István Bibó (one of the few non-Populist yet non-Urban intellectuals in Hungary), common anxieties about national independence, the Hungarian minorities, economic decline, pollution, and so on served as bridges be-

tween the old antagonists. "Why should we not conclude a peace treaty?" some leading Populists and Urbans began to ask themselves.

In fact, there were many reasons in favor of reconciliation. The old generation of Populist-collaborators was dying out. Many of the younger Populists still came from literary circles; nonetheless, their thought patterns were less abstract and archaic than those of their predecessors." On the other side, the liberal dissidents distanced themselves from the top ideological clientele of the Communist leadership, the "Aczél boys" who were discredited in the eyes of the Populists during the "two-front battles" of the party. In principle, the noncommunist groups could have started peace negotiations with a joint agenda, because some typically populist themes (national self-determination, poverty under communism, rural stratification, critique of communist history-writing, etc.) were cultivated or even introduced in public discussions by the liberals themselves. They were no laissez-faire fundamentalists, and the Populists did not dream about "Garden Hungary" any more. The two camps were able to agree on the persons of the mediators (members of the 1956 generation), who managed to organize two major common events unprecedented in the history of anticommunist resistance after the revolution: the *samizdat* publication of the Bibó memorial volume in 1979 and the Monor meeting of intellectuals in 1985. One might have believed that the PU peace of 1956 could be repeated.

However, the Communist control proved to be effective again, the last time before 1989. The Populists, who wanted to save their integrity as a loose spiritual movement of dissenters, considered the Monor meeting as too courageous a first step in anticommunist institution building. In order to avoid the image of hard-core dissidents, they accepted the informal offer made by the Pozsgay group in the Communist leadership concerning a better protection of Hungarian national interests in and outside the country and the provision of certain cultural privileges (e.g., a new journal) for the "patriotic forces." This flirtation brought the motives of treason and sin back into the discussion and prevented the noncommunist groups from blurring the PU boundaries before the 1989 revolution. Instead, the communism-capitalism cleavage became blurred, a tragedy of most Eastern European transitions.

An Old Cleavage in a New Democracy (1989–1996)

From the Roundtable to the Pact

Western observers loved to call the year 1989 *annus mirabilis*. Dissidents in Eastern Europe were also under the spell of the unexpected implosion of communism and the rapid disintegration of the *nomenklatura*. In Hungary there was only one thing that enchanted the oppositionists more:

their own unity. The small Hungarian miracle of 1989 was "cheap" in terms of physical destruction and the Grand Deal that has informally compensated the Communist ruling elite for peaceful resignation.[18] It also proved to be inexpensive because during the so-called "constitutional" revolution, cooperation between the various groups of the anticommunist opposition (and between them and the reformist wing of the Communists) minimized the political costs of the first stages of the transition. No tanks, no strikes, no constitutional vacuum. . . .

Despite the fact that following the 1985 Monor meeting of dissidents the Populist and Urban intellectuals were busy organizing their own—National-Conservative and Liberal—political movements and building up their own parties,[19] the two camps displayed harmony on many crucial issues of the new constitution in the course of the roundtable talks during 1989. True, this harmony was disturbed by mutual suspicion in a conventional PU-style radicalism-versus-moderation debate. The Liberals tended to believe that the National-Conservatives had struck a secret deal with the nationalist wing of the Communist Party, whereas the National-Conservatives were scared by the militant moves of the Liberals. They feared that the acceleration of the revolutionary process might help unite the dislocated groups of the *nomenklatura* and provoke retaliation from Moscow.

There were serious conflicts between the former oppositionists concerning the concessions to be made to the Communists in order to buy their benevolence. (The dismantling of the secret police and the party militia, and the mode of presidential elections, were among the burning questions.) However, the common fear of missing the historical chance for holding free parliamentary elections helped them close their ranks and continue the roundtable talks. Behind the façade of recurrent rhetorical assaults on each other, a unique opportunity for PU peace seemed to crystallize. The constitution-making and the preparations for the elections produced professional players in the center of the political space. It was not only with the Communists that most of the hard-liners were marginalized in the course of the negotiations. The National-Conservatives also strengthened their West-oriented, Christian-Democratic ("national-liberal") faction to the detriment of the radical populist group in the leadership, and the Liberals, too, succeeded in placing a number of young experts (of non-Jewish origin) in the foreground of political bargaining. Optimistic observers believed at that time that a *modus vivendi* existed in the PU confrontation along the lines of liberal patriotism between social (communitarian) liberalism and "decent" nationalism. By 1989 the Liberals qualified themselves as pioneers of national independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and as leading activists in the environmental movement and poverty relief while coquetting with collectivist forms of ownership. At the

same time, part of the National-Conservatives was ready to accept a number of liberal claims ranging from the protection of human rights to privatization. One did not have to be extremely naive to think that the two groups would skip the memory of PU strife and reach back to the common tradition of coupling "progress" with "fatherland"; that is, either to the 1956 revolution, or—if it were considered too socialist oriented—to the 1848 and the 1918 revolutions, which tried to combine capitalist development with national independence in Hungary.[20]

Cooperation between the emerging political parties was first endangered by the referendum on the mode of presidential elections, which was initiated by the Liberals at the end of 1989 to prevent the National-Conservatives from tacitly supporting the Communist candidate. The Liberals won the referendum by cleverly defining its questions, which trick was considered by many of their opponents a *casus belli*. Then the fragile peace was severely hurt by the parliamentary elections during the spring of 1990, which brought up a rivalry between Populists and Urbans within a modern democratic framework. After the ex-Communists had lost the competition in the first round, the National-Conservatives and Liberals wounded each other deeply in an outburst of repressed indignation and hatred. The Populist radicals were eagerly searching for communist Jews in the families of the "nationless" Liberal candidates, while some of the Liberals questioned the good faith, the expertise, and the "Europeanness" of their National-Conservative rivals. As far as the respective political programs were concerned, the National-Conservatives took pride in national liberation, Hungarian traditions, Christian values, and the like and promised a smooth transition in the economy, and the Liberals emphasized the constitutional elements of the revolution (parliamentary democracy, rule of law, human rights, private ownership, and so on) and predicted a bumpy road of the economic transformation. In occupying the National-Conservative and the Liberal halves of the political field, the two camps blamed each other for expropriating and distorting the patriotic and the democratic messages, respectively, and excluding the rival parties from a valuable part of the political discourse.

The damage was partly repaired by the last piece of anticommunist realpolitik right after the elections that ended with a victory of the three National-Conservative parties. A few prominent representatives of the two leading parties in the government and the opposition signed a *sub rosa* pact of power sharing, which reinforced the National-Conservative government vis-à-vis the Parliament but placed the executive branch under Liberal supervision by the president of the Republic, a president who was practically appointed by the opposition. This was the first (and so far the last) major agreement between Populist and Urban forces that followed pragmatic routines of political cooperation.

The Erosion of the Pact and the Birth of the Charta

Although the Liberals attained a landslide victory in the local elections held during the autumn of 1990, providing an opportunity for power sharing between the central and local governments, that is, between the National-Conservatives and the Liberals, a series of highly emotional quarrels erupted instead. The populist radicals, who had not been consulted before the pact was signed, accused the moderates in their own camp of compromising the democratic elections by behind-the-scenes deals with the archenemy. They tried to discipline their colleagues by launching heavy ideological offensives against the Liberals, who were depicted in a familiar style: (1) as urban Jews who, instead of allowing themselves to be assimilated, make successful efforts to assimilate the ethnic Hungarians; and (2) as demagogues who cannot represent the nation with as much moral devotion as the real patriots.[21]

The Liberals in turn were embarrassed by the rapid establishment of new clientelist networks under National-Conservative leadership, the spread of state intervention in business, and the extension of government control in the media, in education, and in the private lives of the citizens under the banner of authoritarian, nationalist slogans from the 1930s. As a typical overreaction, the Liberals did not exclude the possibility of dismissing the government through civil disobedience in the course of a nationwide cab drivers' strike in October 1990—a strike that might have had a violent end if the Liberal president of the Republic had not ruled out the use of force by the government (a typical overreaction on the opposite side).

As a consequence, by the winter of 1990/91, that is, one year after the conclusion of the Roundtable Agreement and half a year after the parliamentary elections, PU relations were again animated by scandals.[22] The influence of the mediating personalities weakened, and negotiated compromises were replaced by rhetorical intransigence. To a certain degree, the mutual accusations became self-fulfilling prophecies. Those blamed as protofascists among the National-Conservatives approached the political right; and those blamed as "Liberal-Bolsheviks" joined forces with the moderate faction of the Neo-Socialists in the Democratic Charta, a loose organization created by leftist liberal intellectuals to prevent the authoritarian degeneration of the revolution. This is where the PU dialogue finally came to a standstill. The moderate National-Conservatives broke with the radical Populists in their ranks too late (in 1993), while the Liberals allowed the Neo-Socialists to come out of political quarantine too early (in 1991). And the two camps did not stop quarreling with each other even when the army of the Neo-Socialists stood already *ante portas.*

The Neo-Socialist Breakthrough

The birth of the Charta marks not only the end of rational political strategies to bridge the PU gap through internal agreements. It also indicates the beginning of a new kind of rationality; namely, a pragmatic strategy to circumvent and neglect the entire controversy. This strategy was formulated by the Young Liberals, then adopted by the Neo-Socialists. Ironically, the old pupil proved to be smarter than his young teacher. The Neo-Socialists managed to abstain from the PU debate and enfranchise their own Urban and Populist sympathizers under the flexible heading of social democracy (something considered European *and* patriotic, liberal *and* solidaristic, modern *and* traditional). At the same time, the Young Liberals alienated a great number of intellectuals (and a much greater number of voters) by emphatically rejecting the whole debate, yet simultaneously flirting with both camps. Eventually, they could not help drifting into the PU conflict.

The Young Liberals embarked upon democratic politics in 1989 with a clear program of PU neutrality. They declared the cleavage to be anachronistic, tragicomic, and inconceivable in terms of pragmatic policymaking.[23] In this spirit, they often distanced themselves from their liberal allies in opposition whenever the latter engaged in an ideological quarrel with the National-Conservatives on national symbols (holidays, coat of arms, anthem, etc.), the interpretation of history (fascism and communism in Hungary, retroactive justice, etc.), and human rights. The Young Liberals regarded the communist versus noncommunist divide as more important than the PU conflict within the noncommunist half of the political spectrum. Doubting the social democratic conversion of the former Communists, they came closer to the National-Conservative parties at the right-of-center. By now the language the Young Liberals use fits in well with the PU framework in many respects (they identify the Liberals with the Neo-Socialists and blame them for free-market orthodoxy, for disregarding family, church, and national issues, for sacrificing the domestic small entrepreneurs and monopolizing the public media, etc.). Nevertheless, this kind of populism (currently they call themselves "civic democrats") is less traditionalist and more liberal than the populism still represented by the radicals in the National-Conservative camp.

Until now, the Neo-Socialists have been able to resist the temptation to get involved in the PU conflict. As with the Young Liberals, this was a deliberate action in order for them to qualify as modern pragmatists, the only label that might cover the seamy side of the Communist Party's past. This label required deep silence on the PU controversy and on any ideology-based division, be it a left-right, a Populist-Urban, or a capitalist-communist typology. Otherwise, these classification schemes would have harmed the image of the Neo-Socialists, striving for relegitimation,

who embodied all contradictions reflected by these schemes. Their election program went like this: reformation with a human face, social market economy, capitalism with national specifics—this is what we—that is, the liberal and patriotic factions of the Hungarian Communists—wanted to achieve from the 1960s on. We will be proud to perform the hard task of "building up capitalism" with social and national responsibility, the Neo-Socialist ideologues said, cross-cutting the traditional PU divide well before their victory in 1994. We are the only guarantee that the pointless ideological debates between self-interested groups of Budapest intellectuals will be terminated and replaced by real progress in transformation. We will act, not talk, and find the middle ground between liberal and national-conservative fundamentalism....

Disillusionment and Fatigue

Half of this prediction was correct. The PU controversy lost much of its fervor in 1995 and 1996, although this was partly because of the lack of the promised "real progress" in transformative politics. A substantial part of the PU conflict has been absorbed by the Neo-Socialist–Liberal coalition. The liberal program has become an amorphous practical project because it has repeatedly been subdued by the Neo-Socialists within the government. True, in principle the very fact of the government coalition can rekindle the embers of the confrontation at any time, but so far the references to the "worldwide Jewish conspiracy of the Communists and the Liberals" have come basically from outside the Parliament.

Thanks to the weakening of the radicals among the National-Conservatives following their election defeat and the growing influence of the Young Liberals in the opposition, illiberal voices in the Parliament are most often heard in the ranks of the Smallholders, a party of—let us call it—post-PU (or postmodern) populism. Although this party had much to do with the Hungarian peasantry before World War II, in its program agrarian populism has always been mixed with the vision of medium-sized capitalist enterprise in the countryside and entrepreneurship in urban areas. After 1989 the Smallholders borrowed part of the radical discourse of the National-Conservatives; now they would like to represent the underclass against any establishment. There is no intellectual coherence in their political moves, and there are no visionary intellectuals in the leadership of the party. The political engineers of the Smallholders are not blurring or denying (like the Neo-Socialists and the Young Liberals) the PU cleavages but alternately or simultaneously representing the conflicting, even the diametrically opposing, visions. Accordingly, while insisting on a generalized antiestablishment rhetoric and using all technical instruments of populism (exaggerated promises, mass mobilization, charismatic leader, etc.), they ridicule the basics of the PU controversy.[24]

In 1998 there will be parliamentary elections in Hungary again. By extrapolating the 1990–1994 cycle of PU quarrels, one could predict the resurgence of heated debates in the political arena very soon. By now, however, a substantial part of the classical PU arguments has become irrelevant, and the marginal electoral profits that can be earned by sharpening the PU conflict seem to be comparatively small. The compromise between the Liberals and the Neo-Socialists devalued some of the typical accusations (lack of social responsibility, obsession with the free market, etc.) leveled at the Liberals by the National-Conservatives. Moreover, the Liberals and the National-Conservatives learned from the success of the Neo-Socialists (the *lachende Dritte*) that a deep involvement in the PU controversy can backfire. Finally, the danger of postmodern (unpredictable because unprincipled) populism may bring together the moderates in the respective PU camps against the common enemy.

In other words, the political space in Hungary is becoming composed of three segments: a social-liberal, a moderate conservative, and a radical nationalist-populist segment. Purely for mathematical reasons, a three-person game offers more opportunity for cooperation and cross-cutting conflicts than a two-person game with relatively homogeneous blocs of Liberals and National-Conservatives. The professionalization of post-communist politics, that is, the replacement of visionary intellectuals by clerks in the new parties, also contributes to reconciliation. Intellectuals in both PU camps feel betrayed by the growing cynicism of the "political animals" within their own parties and frustrated by the recurrent compromises in the political game and the corruption across party lines. The disenchantment that followed an already none-too-enchanting revolution has gradually deprived the PU confrontation of its romantic overtones.[25] The participants in the controversy also recognize that the narrow space for maneuvering in the postcommunist transformation and the complicated procedures of democratic decisionmaking often reduce the large ideological distances between the Populist and Urban positions to minuscule intervals. The parliamentary discussions of the laws on abortion, reprivatization, or teaching religion at schools (just to select three heated debates from the early 1990s) evidenced this convergence in legislation. Business as usual in postcommunist political life results in a growing fatigue for the participants in the PU confrontation. Would rapprochement be based on disillusionment and fatigue?

Resolving or Civilizing the Conflict?

Changing the Plot and Keeping the Scenes

Modern democratic politics has instrumentalized—revitalized, exploited, and partly moderated—a traditional normative conflict in Hungary. Politics was, however, not only a villain but also a victim in the PU

play. In 1989 the confrontation between the Populists and the Urbans was already preceded in the mentality of the new political class. Even if the first noncommunist leaders had arrived in Hungary from the moon, they would not have been able to recruit their entourage from among intellectuals who did not think and speak in PU terms at all, whose life stories were not permeated with the memory of the debate, and whose social networks and cultural institutions were not shaped by personal PU commitments. In any event, recruitment had an opposite direction. The potential advisers became politicians almost overnight. It was exactly these members of the Hungarian intelligentsia (primarily social scientists and writers) who occupied the commanding heights of the transformation and entered the first free "Parliament of historians, poets, and lawyers."

They brought along their friends and colleagues (and not infrequently, their clients and family members), with all their political preferences, language routines, and images of the enemy, the past, and the future. The typical "revolutionary" in Hungary was no Young Liberal allegedly immune to the PU discourse but a gentleman from the 1956 or the 1968 generation, that is, males with university background who were between forty and sixty and who had not been dissidents—on the contrary, normal citizens of "goulash communism," former Communist Party members or adherents to—at least partly—collectivist ideologies (Marxism, social-liberalism, nationalism, authoritarian conservativism, etc.). Hence, the normative toolboxes of the new political actors were almost full; one could reach into them with a reflex motion at the first occasion of conflict. In 1989 the militant strategies of the PU confrontation were fresh not because they had been kept in the "communist refrigerator" for forty years but because they had not been frozen in 1948/49.

Unfortunately, in 1989 the very possibility of the transition from communism reinforced the beliefs of the two camps in the conventional dichotomies. At first sight, the whole *problématique* of the transformation seemed to revalidate the old alternatives of modernization: joining Western capitalism in a European framework or taking one of the Third Roads within national boundaries? imitation or experimentation? progress or fatherland? Both approaches involved a return to history to find "clean sources" before they had become poisoned by the Communists. Under the shock of the unexpected fall of the Soviet system and the pressure of rapid identity creation, the new political elite did not have much time to disentangle the complicated web of similarities and differences between the 1930s, the postwar years, 1956, and the 1990s. As a consequence, very few intellectuals bothered themselves with second thoughts about the obsolescence of some old PU conflicts and the rapprochement between the original positions under (and because of) communism.

This also explains the remarkable continuity of the PU controversy in Hungary. It was not only a political but also a rhetorical drama that contributed to the prolongation of the old debate. "Back to the 1930s: Changing the Plot and Keeping the Scenes"—this is how I would entitle the play.[26] While the Urbans were looking for their ancestors primarily in the 1956 revolution and the short-lived democracy of 1945–1948, the Populists found their golden age between the two wars. Probably the 1930s would not have irritated the Liberals so much, if that decade had only symbolized the plebeian tradition of antiliberalism. However, the Christian Democratic allies of the Populists within the ruling party found their heroes in the same period, emphasizing the Christian, national, and middle-class oriented character of the Horthy regime. This combination of plebeian and elitist symbols (a historical nonsense by the way) could have simply made the Liberals laugh. They exploded instead as they heard the familiar passwords: Trianon, Christian middle class, Jewish capitalism, heroism of the Hungarian soldiers in World War II, etc. The Urbans, who were always accused by the Populists of being ahistorical, let themselves be directed by their memory.

The scene of the PU play of the 1930s was rapidly reconstructed, so it took some years for the actors to realize that the plot has grossly changed in the meantime. The economic programs of the political parties converged[27] and the main lines of the liberal-democratic constitution written by the participants of the roundtable talks in 1989 were not questioned by the National-Conservatives. The controversy of the 1990s was essentially a pre-totalitarianism controversy. In the 1990s, that is, in a post-totalitarian phase and in a Western (or global) environment, it became rather difficult to represent utopian, dirigist, autocratic, etc. programs, at least on the level of practical policymaking. In other words, the Urbans, whoever they were, have won the cultural war in Hungary: The convergence took place on their half of the scene rather than somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the defeat has incited the radical Populists to start desperate rear-guard battles on the level of political rhetoric with the aim of reconquering the scene until the lease of the theater (i.e., the Parliament) expires.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can state that these were typical ersatz-fights, although they were instrumental in destroying some bridges over the PU gap. It did not make a great difference when the members of the Parliament were discussing for weeks whether the royal crown should feature in the national coat of arms, whether a politician may call his colleague unpatriotic, or whether it had been correct to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. At the same time, the rhetorical quarrels created a cultural atmosphere in which vital questions of daily transformative politics such as privatization, economic stabilization, welfare reform, local self-

government, and the like could not be answered in pragmatic terms, and similarly vital issues of human and civic rights such as abortion, the legal position of the church, media control, and so on, could not be discussed in a relatively detached manner. The passions prevented a reasonable compromise between the converging programs. It became clear that the two camps can dislike each other even in the lack of dictators to flirt with.

Mediation on Mediation

The rhetorical prolongation of the debate notwithstanding, the passionate outbursts were less frequent in 1995 and 1996. If we review the various techniques of PU conflict resolution over the past six decades, we do not find a single negotiated peace settlement. Rather, provisional truces were fabricated without firm peacekeeping arrangements. Even the most recent cease-fire (more exactly, "low-intensity warfare") is only partly intentional: It stems to a large extent from common frustration. Denying, ignoring, or ridiculing the confrontation, that is, the latest innovations in PU peacemaking, seem to be helpful in immediate crisis prevention. Although even the imminent danger of a Neo-Socialist breakthrough did not lead to a reduction in the grand gap between the Populists and the Urbans, the bridging of smaller gaps has begun under the pressure of parliamentary realpolitik. The Liberals and the Neo-Socialists on the one hand and the Young Liberals and the National-Conservatives on the other have got closer to each other. Because of these rearrangements there is a growing conviction in Hungary that the PU conflict has no cultural-ideological but "only" civilized, pragmatic solutions. The conflict can be moderated, swept under the carpet, or in the best case, left behind and forgotten, but not resolved. Like a subterranean river, it can break out onto the surface at any time.

The participants in the PU debate have understood that competitive democracy is no panacea: It may cyclically sharpen the conflicts, as well as prevent them from developing into a cultural war. Prevention would mean self-defense, that is, a consensus based on the vested interests of the potential belligerents in the political class to freeze, delay, and thus probably outlive the confrontations. Can this spontaneous process be accelerated by mediation? If one meant by mediation a kind of Freudian therapy whereby prejudices and suppressed aggressive feelings are articulated and memories are mobilized and interpreted to liberate the "patient," I would be rather skeptical about the result of the treatment. The naming of the various stigmas and allegations can revive the hostilities, particularly if no impartial mediator is available. Human speech may be dangerous: In a cultural war that from time to time has been associated with real wars, you can kill with words. Also, it may happen that one of

the conflicting partners ab ovo rejects rational dispute as part and parcel of the opponent's cultural heritage. In any event, mediation requires from the antagonists a certain extent of sobriety, an ability to engage in a dialogue and to accept an arbitrator. What if the patients do not want to see the doctor? "Hate speech," stigmatization, and scapegoating are not the most favorable preconditions for mediation. Self-appointed mediators such as the revolutionaries of 1956, the financier George Soros, or the writer Péter Esterházy (a liberal-minded aristocrat), who all acted in good faith, have not been able to attain lasting results thus far.

Would it be better to leave the collective subconscious as it is, to avoid clear language ("don't ask who shot first," "call the massacre a sad event"), and to accept a kind of moratorium on the therapy? Postwar Germany, France, Austria, and others provide—better or worse—examples for postponing the payment of historical bills and replacing memory with oblivion/amnesia." Also, I wonder if one can advise a "forget rather than talk" moratorium after so many decades of another moratorium under communism that converted almost the same topics of the PU controversy into taboos? Should we create institutions instead that—in contrast to the psychiatrist—perform mediation in an impersonal manner? Western observers tend to trust the emerging civil society in Eastern Europe. Its institutions may localize, fragment, and intersect the big normative conflicts, they say. Will the Populists and the Urbans reconcile with each other if they join the same club of stamp collectors? It may be, especially if one has in mind other, quasi-political organizations of the civil society such as professional associations, single-issue movements, or the church. Unfortunately, the current experience in Hungary shows the duplication of civic initiatives and their integration by the parties: Probably we already have a Populist and an Urban club of stamp collectors. Should one then long for a common enemy (an imperialist Russia, chauvinists in the neighborhood, unreconstructed Communists, and postmodern populists at home or—*horribile dictu*—an ultracentralist European Union) again? Or should we prefer the Yugoslav solution of pushing the confrontation to its extremes in order to compromise it forever? Hopefully, there are less painful ways of PU peacemaking.

Since 1989 democracy has taught the participants in the PU debate to negotiate with each other and honor second-best solutions in the political process. They learned that the language of professional policymaking is rarely bipolar. Multiparty politics with all its lobbying mechanisms helped break the PU dichotomy by cross-cutting the confrontation. Conflicting norms were translated into conflicting interests; business groups entered the scene; new buffer zones emerged; and it turned out that there *are* common solutions. Neither of the two groups could find its "one and only" electorate. Hungarian society did not allow itself to be segmented

into two halves such as the winners and losers of the postcommunist transformation, Western or Eastern Hungary, towns and villages, etc. Representative democracy forced the antagonists to pluralize their agendas, and pluralization meant overlapping programs. Parliamentarism urged many Populists to accept bargaining as such, to obey constitutional procedures and to exchange romantic language for professional discourse. Similarly, it convinced the Urbans that the Populists are inferior partners in a rational discussion only until they learn to accept the rules of the game. Then a veritable rivalry begins between the two sides, neither of which can be sure about his superiority in professional, ideological, or moral terms. So much for the sunny side of democracy.

However cynical it may sound, I would put much faith also in the deficiencies of parliamentary politics and the fin de siècle uncertainty in the field of political ideologies. Ironically, the symptoms of decay, which Western analysts like to enumerate when burying their old democracies (popular distrust of institutions, large-scale corruption, overcomplicated procedures, unfair coalitions, the relativization of political philosophies, etc.), in the new democracies of Eastern Europe may well promote reconciliation through common frustration along the PU front line. True, like in the West, the weakening of liberalism and the success of postmodern populism may be the price of this frustration. Nevertheless, the imperfections of the democratic system work against liberal complacency and reduce the humiliation of the Populist losers: It is not a winner-take-all situation. As a consequence, the demand for prophecies may diminish on both sides. In the optimal case, a common search for non-utopian solutions may follow, in which the former antagonists subscribe to a common minimum of democratic/liberal rules, and in a joint effort, discipline the radicals and exclude the extremists from parliamentary communication.

In a sense, this end-of-century-style democracy made the "uncertain ghosts" of both camps even more uncertain and reduced their direct political activity. The exodus of the party intellectuals from politics has already begun. On the one hand, they were pushed out by professionals, and on the other, they could no longer tolerate that the rank and file betrayed the "sacred" principles of their parties. This largely reduced the heat of the PU strife. A further reduction is expected from the ongoing marketization of the cultural spheres, marketization that should wash away the difference between the state-sponsored intellectuals and the "pariahs"—Populists or Urbans, depending on which camp is in the government.

In 1994 it was the Hungarian citizens who voted for a desacralization in party politics. They made the political class understand that they are not really interested in symbols and memories. By elevating the Neo-Socialists to the government, the electorate happened to be the most powerful mediator in the history of the *Kulturkampf*. All things considered, it

was the voters who started to "civilize" the conflict, that is, like in advanced Western democracies, to keep the hostilities under control (or outside the Parliament). The former enemies feel a bit uneasy in the new atmosphere of partial tolerance. In some years, however, the repeated political compromises between them may result in some cultural synthesis of national-conservativism and social liberalism." Until then, I would not speak of conflict resolution.

With all my respect for the merits as well as the shortcomings of democracy, let me doubt that without a Hungarian *Wirtschaftswunder*, the road leading from truce to peace can be substantially shortened and the ghosts sent back to their graves. The German, Japanese, and other economic miracles after the war were contingent upon normative mediation from outside (not to mention generous economic assistance by the West). In a sense, the losers were sentenced to democratization and liberalization. In contrast to these "happy" losers, those who were defeated in the Cold War forty-four years later receive comparatively less economic aid and even less normative assistance. In Hungary, if one disregards the initiatives of some foreign (primarily German and American) foundations to bring the quarreling parties closer to each other, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were the only external mediators, as a Budapest joke says. Why then, precisely? Because with their unavoidable austerity packages they achieved what no one could achieve in the history of the PU conflict: Half of the liberals converted to populism.

In the absence of Western occupation and a new Marshall Plan, the Populists and the Urbans in Hungary have to work hard to build some kind of normative cohesion from inside. If they succeed, it will be such a formidable accomplishment that even the driest liberals will be imbued with national pride. But how will the nationalists tolerate that?

Notes

I wish to express my gratitude to Éva Kovács for her comments on the manuscript for this chapter.

1. In these clichés the elitist and mystical Slavophils are identified with the later *narodniks*, the real forefathers of Eastern European populists, who were radical agrarian socialists (anarchists) rather than devoted nationalists. For a conceptual clarification, see Daniel Chirot, "Ideology, Reality, and Competing Models of Development in Eastern Europe Between the Two World Wars," *East European Politics and Societies* 3 (1989); Ernest Gellner, *Nationalismus in Osteuropa* (Vienna, 1992); Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford, 1994); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism, Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London, 1969); George Schöpflin, "Conservatism in Central and Eastern Europe," in J. M. Kovács, ed., *Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe* (New

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3. In my view, postmodern populists in Eastern Europe such as Vladimir Meciar, Voislav Sheshel, József Torgyán, Stanislaw Tyminski, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky rely on a traditional antiestablishment discourse, that is, a basically premodern critique of competitive democracy while relativizing the romantic anticapitalist message of their predecessors. For the similarity of their programs with those of Umberto Bossi, Pat Buchanan, Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, or Ross Perot, see J. M. Kovács: "Haider in Ungarn: Notizen zum postmodernen Populismus," *Transit* 11 (1996).

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6. Probably a comparative study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and some of the ex-Yugoslav republics would deliver the most balanced history of the Populist–Westernizer conflict in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the ex-Soviet countries show a shorter period of embourgeoisement and/or a longer phase of hard-line communism. Unfortunately, with Russia one loses a well-cultivated, broad research field and the most spectacular confrontation in the nineteenth century. In the case of Yugoslavia the recurrent ethnic fights camouflage (or suspend) the conflicts between the Populists and the Westernizers. In modern Czech history the agrarian question was always less important than in other countries of the region; nonetheless, the Slavophil connection in the nineteenth century reinforced the populist option. Also, the revival of hard-line communism after the Prague Spring prolonged the break in the Populist–Westernizer controversy. As regards Poland, the hegemony of Catholicism may hide deep cleavages between the nationalists and the liberals. The belonging to Western Christianity and the incessant claim for independence from Russia made Polish Populism less "Eastern."

7. Below I will formally accept these self-designations but challenge their contents step by step.

8. The roots of the PU debate in Hungary go back to the nineteenth century, although when the principles of "fatherland" and "progress," to use the terminology of the time, still seemed to be complementary for a large part of the political and cultural elite. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Trianon peace treaty, the massive assimilation of Jews, the rapidly growing number of the intelligentsia, the communist dictatorship in 1919, the postwar stagnation, the Great Depression, and the delaying of agrarian reforms in the 1920s were all essential reasons for the separation of the two principles in the first decades of the twentieth century.

9. For a literature on the first round of the PU controversy, see Gyula Borbándi, *Der ungarische Populismus* (Munich, 1976); Ferenc Donáth, *A Márciusi Fronttól Monorig* [From the March Front to Monor] (Budapest, 1992); Ferenc Fejtő, *Budapesttől Párizsig* [From Budapest to Páris] (Budapest, 1990); Ferenc Fejtő, "A zsidóság és a népi-urbánus vita" [The Jewry and the Populist-Urban Debate] *Századvég* 2 (1990); Gyula Juhász, *Uralkodó eszmék Magyarországon (1939–1944)* [Dominant Ideas in Hungary] (Budapest, 1983); Miklós Lackó, *Korszellem és tudomány* [Zeitgeist and Science] (Budapest, 1988); András Lengyel, *Utak és csapdák* [Roads and Traps] (Budapest, 1994); Péter Sz. Nagy, ed., *A népi-urbánus vita dokumentumai (1932–1947)* [Anthology of the Populist-Urban Debate] (Budapest, 1990); Dénes Némedi, ed., *A népi szociográfia* [The Populist Sociography] (Budapest, 1985); György Poszler, "Görbe tükör és forgatókönyv: Népiek és urbánusok a marxista kritikában (1937–1943)" [Populists and Urbans in Marxist Critique], *Társadalmi Szemle* 2 (1993); Konrád Salamon, *Utak a Márciusi Front felé* [Roads to the March Front] (Budapest, 1982); Miklós Szabó, *Politikai kultúra Magyarországon* [Political Culture in Hungary] (Budapest, 1989).

10. While the word "Populist" (*népi, népies*) had appeared already in the nineteenth century, the designation "Urban" (*urbánus*) was first used, characteristically in its Latin version, in the late 1920s. The liberals applied it as a synonym of educated, modern, sophisticated, "European" world outlook to contrast it with the backwardness of the countryside, whereas the Populists associated the term with adjectives such as alien, artificial, criminal, and the like (See András Lengyel, op. cit.). The only participant in the debate who acquired world fame is the Paris historian François Fejtő from the Urban group.

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17. Eva Standeisky, "A népi írók és a hatalom" [The Populist Writers and the Communist Power], *Holmi* 10 (1994); Mária Heller, Dénes Némedi, and Agnes Rényi, "A népies beszédmód alakváltozásai az elmúlt harminc évben" [Changes in the Populist Discourse over the Last Thirty Years], in *Közelítések* (Budapest, 1991).

18. Elemér Hankiss, *Eastern European Alternatives: Are There Any?* (Oxford, 1990); László Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition," in Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, 1991); András Bozóki, "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," *East European Politics and Societies*, Spring 1993.

19. The *dramatis personae* are as follows: The *National-Conservatives* comprised the Hungarian Democratic Forum; the Christian Democratic People's Party (Christian-Democrats); and the Independent Smallholders' Party (Smallholders). The *Liberals* comprised the Alliance of Free Democrats (Liberals) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Young Liberals). The *Neo-Socialists* on the scene were in the Hungarian Socialist Party (successor of the reformist majority of the former Communist Party). From 1990 to 1994 the leading force of the National-Conservative government coalition was the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Since 1994 its popularity has decreased (in 1996 the party split in two), while that of the Smallholders has grown. The Christian-Democrats' position has not changed. The Free Democrats were the leading party of the opposition from 1990 to 1994. In 1994, after the landslide victory of the Socialist Party (formerly the smallest in the opposition) the Free Democrats joined them in the government. Since then both of them have lost much of their popularity. The Young Democrats, who had been close allies of the Free Democrats, started to cooperate with the National-Conservatives in the opposition after the 1994 elections. Their popularity is growing.

20. For the post-1989 round of the PU controversy, see Gyula Borbándi, "A népiségkritika nyomorúsága" [The Misery of Criticizing the Populists], *Valóság* 4 (1993); András Bozóki, "Vázlat három populizmusról" [An Outline of Three Populisms], *Politikatudományi Szemle* 3 (1994); Mária Heller and Agnes Rényi, "Discourse Strategies in the New Hungarian Public Sphere: From the Populist-Urban Controversy to the Hungarian-Jewish Confrontation," in Krisztina Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, ed. *Öffentliche Konfliktdiskurse um Restitution von Gerechtigkeit, politische Verantwortung und nationale Identität* (Frankfurt, 1996); Eva Kovács, "Volkstümliche und nationale Identität" (Frankfurt, 1996); Péter Kende, "A lovagi ütközet vége?" [Will the Knightly Struggle End?], *Valóság* 11 (1994); Miklós Lackó, "Népiesség tegnap és ma" [Populism Yesterday and Today], *2000* 10 (1992); Sándor Radnóti, "A populizmusról" [On Populism], *Mozgó Világ* (1992); G. M. Tamás, "Farewell to the Left," *East European Politics and Societies*, Winter 1991; G. M. Tamás, "Ahogyan az ember forgószélben viselkedik" [As One Behaves in a Tornado], *Valóság* 10 (1992); G. M. Tamás, *Kritika* 6 *Századvég* 2 (1990). *Népiek és urbánusok—egy mítosz vége?* [Populists and Urbans—End of a Myth?], especially the response to its questionnaire by András Gergely,

András Gerő, Géza Hegedüs, Péter Kende, László Lengyel, György Litván, György Szabad, Iván Szelényi, Ákos Szilágyi, G. M. Tamás, and Mihály Vajda.

21. See Sándor Csoóri, *Nappali hold* [Moon by Day] (Budapest, 1991); Sándor Radnóti, "Etnosz és démosz" [Ethnos and Demos], *Holmi* 6 (1992).

22. See István Csurka, *Új magyar önépítés* [New Hungarian Self-Construction] (Budapest, 1991); István Csurka, "Néhány gondolat a rendszerváltozásról" [Thoughts about the Change of the System], *Magyar Fórum*, August 20, 1992.

23. See "Népiek és urbánusok," *Századvég*, op. cit.; János Gyurgyák, "Valahol megint utat vesztettünk" [Somewhere we have lost our way again], *2000* 9 (1994).

24. See J. M. Kovács: "Haider in Ungarn," op. cit.

25. The 1989 revolution in Hungary was not glorious, if one does not admire its pragmatic sequence. The first prime minister in the new democracy was no dissident under the Communists; he directed a museum; the second worked as a typical manager of a socialist firm; the third (present) was a member of the Communist terror groups after 1956. One of the chairmen of the two radical populist parties admitted that he served as a secret police agent in the 1960s; the other is still denying that he did.

26. See the articles cited earlier by Kende, Lackó (1992), Radnóti, and Tamás.

27. See Béla Greskovits, "Populista átmenet-programok Magyarországon" [Populist Programs of the Transition in Hungary], *2000* 7 (1996).

28. See Tony Judt, "The Past Is Another Country," *Daedalus*, Fall 1992.

29. It is difficult to predict whether this rapprochement can take place on the level of party politics. Today, the Liberals are embraced by the Neo-Socialists, and the Young Liberals seem to oscillate between moderate and radical National-Conservatives. In any case, it would not harm the peace process if it were preceded by an "apolitical dialogue." See János Kis, "Túl a nemzetállamon" [Beyond the Nation State], *Beszélő* 3/4 (1996).